Who makes decisions,
and who can review them?

Xi Jinping serves as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China. These are offices in different institutions: the general secretary leads the ruling party; the state presidency is a state office. A 2018 constitutional amendment removed the two-consecutive-term limit for the PRC president and vice president. After the CCP’s 20th Congress in 2022, Xi began a third term as general secretary.

These facts should not be conflated: the 2018 amendment changed the state-presidency term clause; it did not directly set the general secretary’s term in the Constitution. The change and the possibility of long-term rule by the top leader are central to debates about checks on power.

Library of Congress: China’s 2018 constitutional amendment ↗　·　Freedom House: China, 2025 report ↗

Freedom House’s 2025 report assesses that Xi has consolidated personal power to a degree not seen in China for decades. The question here is governance structure and political outcomes: more centralized decisions may produce more unified execution, but views from localities, professional fields and society may have less influence. Where media scrutiny, independent organizations and public criticism are limited, channels for detecting and correcting policy mistakes can narrow.

This is an institutional analysis based on the structure of power, not a claim about private motives. Leadership should be assessed by policy aims and development outcomes, and also by whether power is constrained by rules, decisions are transparent, and people affected can dissent and seek remedy.

Freedom House: assessments of centralized power and civic space ↗

Article 1 of China’s Constitution states that leadership by the Communist Party of China is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics; the CCP therefore occupies a central position in state governance. Reports by Freedom House and Human Rights Watch document tight controls over media, online speech, civil society and political dissent, and pressure on critics.

Supporters of this governing model often emphasize stability, development, national mobilization and policy execution. Those goals can be discussed and tested against evidence. From a civil-rights and accountability perspective, long-term rule by a single dominant party, with limited independent oversight and competitive political participation, makes public scrutiny more difficult and can make it harder for society to correct governance failures safely. Criticism of a system does not make CCP members, government employees and Chinese citizens one homogeneous group.

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (English) ↗　·　Human Rights Watch: World Report 2026, China chapter ↗

Strict Zero-COVID policy involved central decisions and local implementation. The gatherings made visible some people’s dissatisfaction with lockdowns, information controls and political accountability. Academic research finds that the protests were not the primary cause of the abrupt policy shift at the end of 2022, but may have played a role in its timing; the epidemic, economic pressures and costs of implementation also matter.

Assessing Xi and the CCP should not rest on a single slogan, nor should one policy reversal be treated as if every demand had been answered. The questions remain: can public opinion influence decisions, can officials be held accountable, and can institutions constrain similar policies in the future?

Journal of Contemporary China: the White Paper Movement and policy change ↗　·　Journal of Democracy: political expression during protests ↗